上市公司配股政策的博弈论分析  

Analysis of the Policies for Right Offering of Corporations with Game Theory

作　　者：王性玉[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院 [2]河南大学管理学院,河南开封475001

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2002年第3期319-322,共4页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

基　　金：河南省高校青年骨干教师资助项目 (豫教高 (2 0 0 1) 2 2 5号 )

摘　　要：通过对监管政策造成的上市公司预期收入缺口曲线的博弈分析 ,指出上市公司配股政策存在的弊端。配股政策是一种优惠政策 ,造成了公司业绩披露的混同均衡 ,进而造成市场效率的下降。从根本上解决这一问题的措施是放宽直至取消配股要求。当前可暂以净资产收益率作为配股依据 ,再选一些附加财务指标 ,这样即可部分克服混同均衡引起的信息甄别上的困难 ,也同时增加了上市公司操纵业绩的难度。Based on the analysis of the expected income discontinuity curves of corporations with game theory, which are commonly believed to be caused by the supervision policies, the deficiencies of the policies are pointed out. The policies are preferential ones, resulting in pooling equilibrium of the financial reports from the corporations, and further causing inefficiency of stock market. The ways to solve this problem are to relax and eventually call off the requirement of that the net asset yield is not less than 6% that is a criterion to decide if a corporation can get a right offering opportunity. As a temporary measure, the right offering of a corporation may be decided according to its net assets yield as well as some other financial indexes.

关 键 词：上市公司 配股政策 博弈论分析 证券市场 分离均衡 混同均衡 净资产收益率 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学] F276.6