风险投资投资过程的逆向选择和道德风险  

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Investing of Venture Capital

作　　者：王雁茜[1] 周启功[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,杭州310027 [2]中国建设银行浙江省分行,杭州310003

出　　处：《科研管理》2002年第3期105-111,共7页Science Research Management

摘　　要：本文运用博弈论与信息经济学的理论与方法 ,借助数学模型和供求曲线深入分析了风险投资项目选择中逆向选择的形成过程与机理 ,并区分了投资过程中存在的两类道德风险 ,从理论上论证了投资过程中逆向选择和道德风险产生的根源在于风险投资公司与风险企业两大交易主体之间信息分布的不对称 。By means of Game Theory and Information Economics, This paper gives a detailed analysis about adverse selection in the investing of Venture Capital with mathematical model and supply-demand curve. It is caused by asymmetrical distribution of information between Venture Capital corporation and venture business in terms of our studies. Furthermore,we differentiate two kinds of moral hazard which could be raised by different reasons. In the last,the paper discusses how to design feasible mechanism to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard and resolve these problems.

关 键 词：风险投资 逆向选择 道德风险 机制设计 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]