企业家形成过程的进化博弈分析  

Entrepreneur or Non-Entrepreneur: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

作　　者：李少斌[1] 高鸿桢[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2002年第3期26-31,114,共7页Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 (79870 0 4 0 )

摘　　要：择业者能否成为企业家 ,取决于个人能力、受教育水平以及社会经济条件等因素。运用进化博弈论 ,可把择业者按是否具有企业家潜能 ,分为潜在企业家和普通劳动力 ;把个体择业者选择的职业 ,相应地分为企业家和工人。分析表明 ,无论择业者是否知道自己具有成为企业家的潜能 ,他根据其选择的预期收益 ,经过其行为的长期调整 ,终能以确定的概率决定是否进行企业家人力资本投资。Whether a job-seeker will become an entrepreneur depends on such factors as ability, education, socio-economic conditions, etc. Using the evolutionary game theory, this study classifies job-seekers, according to their amount of potential for becoming entrepreneurs, into two categories: potential entrepreneurs and ordinary labourers, whose professions are consequently labeled “entrepreneur' and “worker'. Our analysis shows that, whether a job-seeker knows he has potential for becoming an entrepreneur or not, he can still decide whether he can make entrepreneur human capital investment according to expected returns of his choice and after a long-term adjustment of his behaviour.

关 键 词：进化博弈论 人力资本投资 混同均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学] F224.32