拍卖机制中的效率——对IPO询价发行方式的一种研究  

The Efficiency of Outcry Mechanism——Research of IPO Inquiry Emission Model

作　　者：潘镇[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《当代财经》2002年第7期35-39,共5页Contemporary Finance and Economics

摘　　要：用拍卖解决资源分配问题应该实现配置效率。在Myerson的最优机制设计中,取得收益最大化的拍卖商并不总是有效率地分配资源。依据修正后的有效拍卖机制原则,我们发现,由于投资者之间可获得的最大持股数的不平衡,大(机构)投资者在IPO市场中处于优势地位,他们总有动力去隐藏需求,这会导致股权分配的无效率。而无效率地分配股权,不仅不利于资金的合理流动,影响证券市场长期稳定的发展,也会制约上市公司通过资本市场融资的能力。Use Outcry solve the problem of resource distribution should realize disposition efficiency.In Myerson's best mechantsm design,the auctioneers who had biggest benefits didn't distribute resource efficiently.According to the priciple of efficient outcry mechanism correctly,We found that cause the un-balance of biggest stock owned in investors,big investor in the advantageous position in IPO market,they always have motive power to hide requirment ,and result in the un-efficiency of share ownership distribution.Share ownership distrbution not only harm the rational float of capital,not only harm the rational float of capital,but also affect the stock market developing Longly and steady,and restrict the ability of listing company finanic from stock market.

关 键 词：拍卖机制 IPO 询价发行 股权分配 

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