汇率制度、流动性不足与货币危机  

Exchange Rate System,Illiquidity and Currency Crisis

作　　者：贺学会[1] 姜建强[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200437

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2002年第4期33-37,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：亚洲金融危机之后 ,金融危机再次成为理论上的热点问题。本文认为 ,内生于钉住汇率制度的道德风险是造成东南亚国家金融体系脆弱的主要原因 ,而脆弱的金融体系、大量的短期外汇负债又会在国际资本的冲击下最终导致钉住汇率制度的崩溃。虽然危机前 ,各国在维护钉住汇率制度和保护国内金融体系这两个目标之间更趋向于后者 ,但是对于一个短期外债比例较大的东南亚国家来说 ,一旦货币危机发生会反过来对国内脆弱金融体系造成更大的冲击 ,并引发国内的银行危机。因此 ,当经常项目持续逆差主要是由短期外债的流入来融资的 ,为了避免双重危机 (Twincrises)货币危机和银行危机的爆发 ,就需要一场主动的、及时的汇率贬值来纠正。In the aftermath of Asian financial crisis, the subject of currency crisis has been the hotly debated issue again in the literature. This paper argues that, the moral hazard, which is an endogenous element in the pegged exchange rate system, caused the fragility of Asian financial system, meanwhile the fragile financial system, or the huge amount of the short-term foreign debt caused the collapse of pegged exchange rate system when facing the assault of international speculators. Although in the choice between maintaining the pegged exchange rate and protecting domestic financial system the Asian countries seemed to prefer the latter one. To a south-east Asian country with high percentage of short-term foreign debt, monetary crisis could have immense impact to the fragile domestic financial system, and incur bank runs. Therefore, when the current account deficits are financed by the inflow of short-term foreign debt, an initiative and timely devaluation is necessary to avoid the Twin crises-currency crisis and banking crisis.

关 键 词：汇率制度 流动性 货币危机 钉住汇率制度 道德风险 金融体系 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F820.5