掠夺还是治理——基于上市公司贷款公告的经验研究  

Expropriation or Governance——An Empirical Study Based on Listed Company Loan Announcements

作　　者：鹿新华[1] 陈震[1] 张合金[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学金融学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2014年第4期71-79,共9页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"金融危机后中美银行业效率及其影响因素研究-基于盈利视角的比较分析"(JBK1307155)

摘　　要：基于信号理论的框架,以贷款公告为研究对象,分析大股东是否通过银行贷款来掠夺中小股东和银行。结果发现,多个事件窗口贷款公告的累积超额收益率都显著为负,并且借款企业的两权分离程度越高伴随着累积超额收益率越低。这表明银行贷款会增加大股东控制资源的能力,为其掠夺中小股东提供便利。同时,银行的风险监督机制对于大股东的这种掠夺行为没有起到缓解作用。这说明银行贷款更多成为大股东掠夺中小股东和银行的手段,而没有表现出治理监督功能。This study, based on signal theory and taking loan announcement as subject, analyzed whether major- ity shareholders expropriate minority shareholders and banks through bank loans. The results show that the cumula- tive abnormal return （CAR） of many event window loan announcements is significantly negative, and that the higher the separation degree of the two rights, the lower the CAR, which suggests that bank loans will increase the ability of majority shareholders to control the resources and facilitate their expropriating the minority shareholders. Meanwhile, the bank＇s risk supervision mechanisms fail to alleviate majority shareholders expropriation, which indicates that the bank loan is more a means for majority shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders and banks than a means of governance and supervision.

关 键 词：贷款公告 掠夺效应 银行监督 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]