上市公司、审计师与监管机构的财务舞弊博弈研究  

The Game amongst Listed Companies,Auditors and the Regulatory Authorities in Terms of Financial Frauds

作　　者：陈佳声[1] 

机构地区：[1]审计署驻沈阳特派员办事处

出　　处：《审计研究》2014年第4期89-96,共8页Auditing Research

摘　　要：基于财务舞弊理论,本文对上市公司与外部审计师、上市公司管理层与内部审计师和上市公司与监管机构之间的财务舞弊进行博弈分析,并利用资本市场相关数据进行实证检验。研究发现:监管部门的及时介入有效减少了上市公司的持续舞弊,监管部门的处罚对上市公司舞弊的减少作用不显著,管理层自利行为加大了上市公司财务舞弊的风险,同时,外部审计师对上市公司财务舞弊违规的监督作用并不理想。监管部门应降低监督成本,加大处罚力度以降低上市公司舞弊的概率,上市公司治理层应完善公司治理结构与高管薪酬体系,强化内部审计对管理层的约束,外部审计师要保持独立性并积极发挥监督作用。Using game theory, this thesis is to analyze the relations amongst listed companies, auditors and the regulatory authorities in terms of financial frauds. With empirical study of the data in Chinese share market, this paper found out that timely intervention from the regulatory authorities can reduce continuous frauds of the listed companies, However punishment from the authorities means not so much for fraud reduction. Management＇ s focusing on selfin terests would increase the risk of fraud. Also, external auditors in China contribute limited impact on the regulation of listed companies＇ frauds. This thesis put forward the suggestions that to reduce financial frauds, the authority should lower monitoring cost, severely punish those advises acrocontrol and encourage external auditors to contribute more positive impacts. At the same time, those are charge with governance should improve both governance structure and remuneration package as well as make good use of internal auditors to supervise the management.

关 键 词：财务舞弊 监管 审计 博弈 上市公司 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275F239.4