基于系统动力学的地方政府与制造企业碳减排演化博弈分析  

Analysis of an Evolutionary Game between Local Governments and Manufacturing Enterprises under Carbon Reduction Policies Based on System Dynamics

作　　者：朱庆华[1] 王一雷[1] 田一辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第3期71-82,共12页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金(71025002);国家重点基础研究发展计划(2011CB013406);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71033004)

摘　　要：为探究中国在碳减排政策下地方政府与制造企业双方的博弈关系,在分析地方政府和制造企业不同策略下的成本和收益的基础上,采用系统动力学方法构建了地方政府和制造企业之间的静态混合策略演化博弈模型;进一步引入政府动态惩罚和补偿策略,剖析政企双方策略的互动机制。分析结果表明:地方政府对企业是否采取碳减排措施的奖惩力度、企业采取碳减排措施的成本与收益,会直接影响博弈结果;地方政府和制造企业两个群体在三种情况下存在演化稳定策略;在一定条件下,系统演化呈现周期性特征;当地方政府实施动态惩罚或补偿措施时,该博弈模型存在稳定的Nash均衡点。In order to investigate the evolutionary game relationships between local governments in China and manufacturing enterprises under carbon reduction policies,this paper analyzes their respective costs and benefits,and establishes a static mixed-strategy game model between governments and manufacturing enterprises based on the system dynamics method. It further integrates dynamic subsidy and punishment strategies by governments to examine the interaction mechanism between governments and manufacturing enterprises. The analysis result shows that subsidies and punishments on manufacturing enterprises from governments,manufacturing enterprises＇ costs and benefits directly affect the game results; and three evolutionary stable strategies between governments and manufacturing enterprises exist. Under certain conditions,the evolutionary system shows the cyclical characteristics,and the mixed-strategy game model has stable Nash equilibrium when governments implement dynamic penalty strategy or dynamic compensation strategy.

关 键 词：碳减排 系统动力学 演化博弈 动态策略 地方政府 制造企业 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32