基于契约设计的第四方物流质量风险管理  

Contract Design Based Quality Risk Management for Fourth Party Logistics

作　　者：徒君[1,2] 黄敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学信息科学与工程学院,流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室(东北大学),辽宁沈阳110819 [2]辽宁工程技术大学理学院,辽宁阜新123000

出　　处：《信息与控制》2014年第3期276-281,共6页Information and Control

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071028;70931001;71021061;61070162);国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(61225012);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金优先发展领域资助课题(20120042130003);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20110042110024;20100042110025);工信部物联网发展专项资金资助项目;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N110204003;N120104001)

摘　　要：从第四方物流的视角,对外包物流质量风险管理进行了研究.基于委托代理理论与契约设计知识,考虑到第三方物流的风险规避和私有信息,分别在不同场景下研究最优契约设计问题,获得了第四方物流的最优契约参数和第三方物流的最优努力程度.研究表明,所设计风险共担契约能够有效地激励第三方物流努力工作,降低物流质量风险.同时,第三方物流的风险规避和不对称信息都会增加第四方物流质量风险.计算实验的结果揭示,风险规避对第四方物流质量风险的影响往往比不对称信息的影响显著.Quality risk management of out sourced logistics is studied from a fourth party logistics perspective. Based on principal-agent theory and contract design knowledge and considering the third party logistics risk a- verse and private information, the optimal contract design under different scenarios is studied. The optimal contract parameters for fourth party logistics and the optimal effort level for third party logistics are then obtained. The results reveal that the derived contract can induce the third party to work hard and effectively re- duce the logistics quality risk. Meanwhile, the study shows that both risk averse and asymmetric information of the third party logistics will increase the fourth party logistics quality risk. The results of computational studies reveal that the effect of risk averse information on the fourth party logistics quality risk is usually more significant than that of asymmetric information.

关 键 词：第四方物流 质量风险管理 契约设计 不对称信息 风险规避 

分 类 号：F252-3[经济管理—国民经济]