农业大户和龙头企业领办型农民专业合作社的契约研究——基于交易费用理论的解释  

The Contractual Nature of the Farmer Cooperatives Controlled by the Leading Farmers and Enterprises—An Explanation Based on the Transaction Cost Theory

作　　者：李武江[1] 

机构地区：[1]嘉兴学院南湖学院,浙江嘉兴314001

出　　处：《嘉兴学院学报》2014年第4期91-97,共7页Journal of Jiaxing University

摘　　要：关于农业大户和龙头企业领办型农民专业合作社契约性质有三种观点:企业契约,商品契约,超市场契约。通过案例剖析了此类合作社契约的特征是一个复合性、动态性、权威性的商品契约。运用交易费用理论解释了这一契约产生的经济逻辑是其交易费用既低于纯粹市场契约的交易费用,又低于一体化企业契约的组织成本。其实质是一组无形资产的间接定价机制。这种契约也是一种精巧的制度安排,既将一组无形资产的生产活动卷入社会分工,又避免了对此类活动的投入与产出的直接定价。From the perspective of transaction cost theory,this paper explains the contractual nature of the farmer cooperatives controlled by the leading farmers and enterprise.It is a compound,relational commodity trading contract,which has a characteristic of＂authority＂.The transaction cost theory is used to explain the economic logic of this contract,i.e.its transaction cost is lower than the pure market contract transaction cost and the organization cost of the integrated enterprise contract.Its essence is an indirect pricing mechanism about agroup of intangible assets.This contract is also a kind of delicate system arrangement.It involves the production activities of intangible assets into social division of labor,avoiding the direct pricing of the input and output of these activities.

关 键 词：农业大户 龙头企业 农民专业合作社 商品契约 要素契约 

分 类 号：F321.2[经济管理—产业经济]