官员视察与企业联盟——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据  

Government Officials' Inspections and Enterprise Alliance:Empirical Evidence from Listed Manufacturing Enterprises in China

作　　者：罗党论[1] 李晓霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2014年第3期3-20,共18页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70902024);广东省教育厅育苗工程项目(wym11085)

摘　　要：随着联系密切而竞争激烈的全球化市场不断发展,企业意图通过联盟合作来应对挑战。但是由于信息不对称的存在,如何寻找潜在优秀的或者有特质的合作伙伴成为一大难题。基于信号传递理论,官员视察可以作为有效的质量信号和政企关系信号传递,帮助企业解决信息不对称的同时,推动企业联盟的市场行为。以2004-2007年制造业上市公司为样本,实证分析官员视察对企业联盟的影响。结果表明,官员视察活动对企业联盟有显著的积极影响;官员视察对在制度环境越差地区的企业联盟影响更大;但官员视察对企业联盟的影响在国企、民企之间没有显著差异。With the development of the closely-connected and highly competitive global market,enterprises tend to engage in alliance in order to survive and grow rapidly.However,it is difficult for enterprises to find out the potentially excellent partners because of information asymmetry. Based on the signaling theory, our study finds that the government officials＇ inspections is an effective signal of enterprise quality and governmententerprise relationship,which helps mitigate the information asymmetry and promote the alliance among enterprises. Using a sample of listed manufacturing enterprises in China from 2004 to 2007,this study investigates the effects of officials＇ inspections on enterprise alliance. It is shown that officials＇ inspections have a significantly positive effect on enterprise alliance. The effect is more pronounced in the regions where the institutional environment is worse. However,there is no significant difference in the effect between the state-owned enterprises（ SOEs） and the non state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：官员视察 企业联盟 信号理论 制度环境 产权性质 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F832.51[政治法律—中外政治制度]