银行监督的动态治理效应分析——基于中国上市公司的经验证据  

The Dynamic Governance Effect of Bank Monitoring:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：初海英[1,2] 王海霞[3] 王小凤[3] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北武汉430070 [2]内蒙古财经大学金融学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010051 [3]北京城市学院公共管理学部,北京100094

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2014年第3期104-112,共9页Accounting and Economics Research

摘　　要：财务理论与实证研究认为,银行作为企业一个重要的利益相关者,能够对借款人形成积极的治理效应。银行实践中是通过事前监督、事中与事后监督这样一个动态机制来实现其作用的。在区别了银行监督与债权治理、债务治理的基础上,实证分析了银行监督在不同阶段的治理效应。结果表明,银行的事前监督是有效的,这可以极大地降低逆向选择风险,但事中与事后监督呈无效性特点,这说明道德风险的隐患仍然不容忽视。Financial theory and empirical research reveal that as an important stakeholder,bank has a positive governance effect on borrowers. In pratice, bank monitoring is a dynamic mechanism which consists of ex-ante monitoring and ex-post monitoring. This paper distiguishes bank monitoring, credit governance and liability governance,and then analyzes the governance effect of bank monitoring in different stages.The empirical results show that banks＇ ex-ante monitoring is effective,which can reduce the risk of adverse selection. However,the ex-post monitoring is ineffective,implying the presence of moral hazard in Chinese enterprises.

关 键 词：银行 事前监督 事中/后监督 动态治理 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F832.51