破解联合国气候变化谈判的困局——基于不完全契约理论的视角  

Solution to the Dilemma of UN Climate Change Negotiations:From the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory

作　　者：吕江[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心,山西太原030006

出　　处：《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第4期95-104,共10页Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"欧美新能源立法的制度性设计及中国的路径选择研究"(11CFX069);中国法学会部级课题"德班平台下应对气候变化单轨制安排的法律问题研究"(CLS(2013)D225)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：当前,联合国气候变化谈判步履维艰,这在一定程度上凸显了其制度安排的匮乏。因此,为实现全球温室气体减排的目标,联合国气候变化谈判亟须拓展必要的制度创新。而契约经济学中不完全契约理论的前沿成果,无疑有助于揭开联合国气候变化谈判的过程本质,并在一定意义上为未来气候变化制度安排提供一种新的理论旨趣。对此,在联合国气候变化谈判中,中国应强化对程序性事项的考量,在碳排放的制度设计中密切关注产权安排;同时,在有效防范制度设计对中国套牢的前提下,应尽可能多地拓展中国气候变化谈判的剩余控制权。The UN climate change negotiations are in a difficult time, highlighting the lack of institutional arrangements to a certain extent. Therefore, for the purpose of realizing global greenhouse gas emission reduction, UN climate change negotiations are urgent to need the insti tutional innovation. It is no doubt that the frontier achievements of incomplete contract theory in contract economics help to reveal the nature of the process of UN climate change negotiations and provide a new theoretical purport for future climate change institutional arrangements. There fore, in UN climate change negotiations, China should strengthen the consideration of procedural matters and pay close attention to the arrangements of property right in institutional design of carbon emission; meanwhile, on the premise of effectively preventing China from being stuck by institutional design, it should extend the residual rights of control in Chinese climate change negotiations as much as possible.

关 键 词：不完全契约 气候变化谈判 德班平台 剩余控制权 

分 类 号：DF468[政治法律—环境与资源保护法学]