代理人激励冲突与组织内耗——商业银行审贷分离制度问题研究  

The Conflicts of Agent's Incentive and Internal Friction in Organizations——A Study on the Chinese Commercial Banks Loan Approval Separation System

作　　者：苏志强[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院工商管理博士后流动站,上海200433 [2]中国华融资产管理股份有限公司博士后科研工作站,北京100033

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2014年第4期9-14,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：商业银行审贷分离制度在提高风控水平的同时,对业务及审查部门产生了一定的负面激励,造成了组织内耗。通过建立商业银行审贷分离模型,讨论了审贷分离机制存在的负面激励以及委托人收益损失,认为代理人激励目标非一致性、岗位高度专业化、地位平等以及风险偏好与制度目标的冲突,是导致商业银行审贷分离制度组织内耗的主要原因。The Loan Approval Separation System improves the level of risk control, while it makes negative motivation for the lending department and the approval department, thereby giving rise to internal friction. In this study, a Loan Approval Separation System Model was developed to elaborate the negative motivation of the Loan Approval Separation System as well as clients＂ losses brought about by this system. This paper believes that the main reasons for the internal friction from the Loan Approval Separation System are conflicts between the incentives of inclividuals with the agency, the high specialization of the positions, the equity of status, as well as the conflict between the risk preference and the institutional goals. This study provides suggestions from the perspectives of compensation incentive, transparency of job informa- tion, reviewing system, and human resource management.

关 键 词：审贷分离 委托代理 组织内耗 负面激励 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]