我国老年人、基层医疗所与政府的博弈分析  

Analysis of Games among the Aged、Primary Medical Clinics and Governments in China

作　　者：曲卫华[1] 王若宾[2] 

机构地区：[1]太原学院计算中心,山西太原030032 [2]北方工业大学计算机及网络管理中心,北京100144

出　　处：《太原大学学报》2014年第2期24-27,共4页Journal of Taiyuan University

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目"基于老龄化进程加速背景的老年人电子服务采纳影响因素交互作用研究"(12YJC630209)

摘　　要：从博弈论的角度出发,建立了老年人、基层医疗所与政府主管部门之间的博弈模型,并对模型均衡进行了求解。结果表明:老年人去基层医疗所就医与优质资源基层医疗所的成本和收益相关;政府监管与基层医疗所违规的收益和罚金相关。通过优化基层医疗资源、加大老年人去基层医疗所就医的优惠力度和加强政府监管,一定程度上可缓解老年人看病不方便等问题。This paper establishes the game theory models among the aged, primary medical clinic and governments, based on the game theory, and seeks the solutions to the equilibrium steady. The analysis shows that the aged go to see a doctor to primary medical clinic which is related to cost benefit of primary medical clinic ,and that the government regulation is related to the irregular gains of the clin- ics and the fine penalty. To some extent,it can solve the problems that the aged are not convenient to see a doctor to the primary medical service by optimizing primary medical resources, increasing allowance on the aged seeing a doctor to primary clinic and strengthening governments regulation.

关 键 词：老年人 基层医疗改革 博弈 医疗资源 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]