出行选择行为的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Trip Model Choice Behavior

作　　者：肖海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北第二师范学院数学与统计学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第13期11-17,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：湖北省教育厅科学技术研究重点项目(D20143002)

摘　　要：为缓解城市交通拥堵,通过分析出行者出行选择方式的博弈心理,建立了交管部门与出行者策略选择的决策博弈模型,应用演化博弈的思想分析了交管部门对私家车管理与不管理、出行者选择私家车与选择公交车出行各自两种策略选择的演化过程.根据雅克比矩阵的局部稳定性,对演化稳定状态进行了分析,并对一些主要参数对选择行为的影响进行了研究,结果表明,交管部门对公交车的激励效应以及对私家车管理效应对出行者出行方式选择行为的演化起着至关重要的作用.在讨论过程中,对各种情况做了详细地分析和解释,可以为政府决策部门提供相应的参考.To alleviate the jam in the city, we established the game between traffic depart- ment and travelers through the analysis of travel choice of game psychology, analyzed the controlling idea of traffic department to private car and the choice behavior of travelers in evolution process. According to the Jacobian matrix of the local stability, the evolutionary stable state is analyzed, and some main parameters＇ effect to the choice behavior was studied. The results show that＇the government＇s impelling to the public transport and penalty to the private vehicle play an important role in evolution of traffic individual＇s behavior, which may provide corresponding reference to the government＇s decision-making body.

关 键 词：交通拥堵 私家车 演化博弈 稳定性 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]