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出 处:《计算机工程与应用》2014年第14期68-73,共6页Computer Engineering and Applications
基 金:国家自然科学基金(No.NSFC60602066;No.NSFC60773203;No.NSFC611710711);深圳市科技计划项目资助(No.JC201005250035A;No.JC201005280404A;No.JC201005250047A)
摘 要:在无线传感器网络中,由于能量和资源有限,不是每个节点都愿意为邻节点提供转发服务。讨论了无线传感器网络中自私节点的问题,提出了一个博弈模型,设计了一个基于节点信誉和能量的效用函数来监测恶意节点和自私节点,并鼓励节点中有更多的合作。在所提算法中,每个节点维护有邻节点的信誉表,参与转发的节点可以获得信誉作为奖励,而表现自私的节点则会丢失信誉作为惩罚。同时,转发会消耗节点能量,节点的信誉值和剩余能量必须都大于阈值才能在网络中共存。这样,恶意节点最终会被排除网络,自私节点则可以在激励下通过调整转发概率来避免被孤立。In wireless sensor networks, due to the energy and resource constraints, a node may be unwilling to forward packets for its neighbors. In this paper, it studies the selfish behaviors of selfish nodes in wireless sensor networks. Specifi-cally, it models the interactions of sensors as a game. It also presents a utility function based on reputation and energy con-sumption of nodes to monitor the malicious and selfish nodes. To encourage cooperation among nodes, in the proposed algorithm, nodes succeeding in forwarding can gain reputation as a reward while those who act selfishly will lose reputa-tion as a punishment. With incentive mechanism in the algorithm, the malicious nodes are isolated, and the behaviors of selfish nodes can be restricted by acting more cooperatively.
分 类 号:TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]
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