我国职业体育劳资纠纷的博弈分析  

Analysis of Disputes between Labor and Management by Game Theory in China's Professional Sports

作　　者：崔雪梅[1] 张爱红[2] 王永[2] 白旭盛[2] 鲁正道 刘进慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]廊坊师范学院体育学院,河北廊坊065000 [2]北京体育大学研究生院,北京100084

出　　处：《西安体育学院学报》2014年第4期411-414,共4页Journal of Xi'an Physical Education University

基　　金：国家体育总局哲学社会科学基金项目(1948SS13109)

摘　　要：运用文献资料法,从博弈论视角研究了我国体育劳资关系。研究表明:我国职业体育劳资纠纷的特点呈复杂多样化趋势。在体育信息完全静态博弈时,体育劳资方要选择的战略必须是针对博弈方选择战略的最优反应,劳资方都愿意独自离弃他所选定的战略,博弈是重复的。在体育信息完全动态博弈时,博弈是无限的,体育劳资双方就可以相互合作、摆脱困境。博弈是有限的,体育劳资方之间的合作就不可能。而运动员的过度使用、运动员过剩都是"公地悲剧"的典型例子。研究旨为在社会主义市场经济条件下建立我国高效的职业体育劳资纠纷协调、解决机制,构筑和谐体育劳资关系,推动体育法改革,促进体育事业及体育市场的健康和谐发展提供理论支持及智力支持,并为解决其他行业的劳资纠纷提供参考建议,为构建和谐的社会主义产生积极影响。The article, proceeding from Game Theory, uses methods of literature consultation to explore the disputes between labor and management in China＇ s professional spots. The research shows that there is a trend of complication and diversity of characteristics in such relationship. When sports information is in fully static game, the strategy chosen by one party shall be of maximum response against its counterpart and then the parties involved in disputes is willing to give up, resulting the repetition of the game. However, when sports information is fully dynamic by nature, the parties involved are willing to cooperate to move out of situation deadlocked. The game at this time is infinite. When, however, the game is definite, it is impossible for two parties to work cooperatively. Excessive exploitation of the athletes and athletes surplus are two typical examples of the ＂ragedy of the Commons＂. The research is helpful to build the efficient mechanism settlement of sports labor disputes under China~ socialist market economy. Hopefully, it may provide theoretical and intellectual support for harmonious sports labor - management relations, for sports law reform, for healthy growth of the sports industry and sports market. All these will contribute to constructing a harmonious socialism.

关 键 词：职业体育 体育劳动关系 职业体育劳资纠纷 博弈论 体育信息 

分 类 号：D912.16[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]