风险态度、劳动契约选择与当事人决策行为——基于比较制度实验的研究  

Risk Attitude,Labor Contract Choice and the Decision-making Behavior of Contract Core Stakeholders:Based on Comparative Institutional Experiment

作　　者：任广乾[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2014年第4期126-134,160,共9页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"竞争与制度交互下的公司金融契约治理:行为分析与实验检验"(U1304705);教育部人文社会科学基金项目"基于终极控制权的大股东治理及其现金股利行为研究"(12YJA630074);河南省教育厅科学技术研究重点项目"媒体监督;公司治理与中小投资者保护"(13A630594)

摘　　要：劳方和资方的议价能力决定了劳动契约的属性,而劳资双方的风险态度则是影响各自议价能力的重要因素。本文利用比较制度实验的方法,分析不同风险态度的委托人在面对信任契约、奖励契约和惩罚契约时的选择倾向,不同风险态度的代理人实际努力水平的差异,以及风险态度对双方收益的影响。研究结果表明:除对信任契约和奖励契约下的委托人行为没有显著影响外,风险态度对委托人的契约选择行为、代理人的实际努力水平以及他们的总收益都存在着显著的影响。这一研究结论为劳动契约设计的激励相容提供了行为基础。The bargaining abilities of worker and employer determine the property of the labor contract,while their risk attitudes are the important factors affecting their bargaining abilities.In this paper,we analysis the choice orientations of consigners with different risk attitudes when they are faced with trust contract,encouragement contract and punishment contract,the difference of the effort levels of agents with different risk attitudes,and the effect of risk attitude on their benefits comparatively by the method of comparative institutional experiment.The results show that risk attitude has significant effects on the contract choice of consigner,the effort level of agent and the total benefits of both sides,except the behavior of consigner in the comparative institution of trust contract and encouragement contract.These results provide a behavioral foundation for the incentive compatibility in the design of the labor contract.

关 键 词：风险态度 劳资关系 劳动契约选择 比较制度实验 

分 类 号：F246[经济管理—劳动经济]