企业控制权冲突、会计信息质量与市场业绩  

Research on the conflict of state-owned enterprise control right in china:based on the accounting information quality and the market performance

作　　者：李晓东[1] 秦竞博[2] 

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院会计学院,河南郑州450052 [2]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100081

出　　处：《河南社会科学》2014年第5期75-78,123,共4页Henan Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社科项目(10YJC790148);河南省青年骨干教师项目(2010GGJS-144)

摘　　要：我国国有企业委托人被赋予的企业控制权,相对于代理人对企业的控制权并不处于劣势。基于我国资本市场的经验数据,利用能够反映代理人控制权影响力大小的会计信息应计质量,研究我国国有企业委托人控制权与代理人控制权的冲突及其后果。我们发现,国家股控股上市公司的会计信息质量显著高于其他国有和民营上市公司,这实际上是代理人控制权受到压制的一种表现;而国家股控股上市公司的市场业绩低于其他上市公司的现象,表明国有企业委托人控制权对代理人控制权的压制,可能抵消了其在资源禀赋上的优势,致使这类公司虽然具有优良的会计业绩,却并未获得投资者的青睐。其政策含义是,一味强化国有企业委托人控制权可能会带来负面影响。The control rights of state-owned enterprises principals is not at an disadvantage positionagainst the agents in china. Because the accrual quality of accounting information is a representinstrument, with which we could estimate the control rights of the state-owned enterprises agents. In thispaper, based on the accrual quality of accounting and the capital market data in 2004-2008, we haveresearched the conflict of control rights of state-owned enterprises. We find, the national stock holdingcorporate have the significant higher accrual quality than other state-owned corporate, and privatecorporate. But the market performance of national stock holding corporate is less than other listedcorporate. That meaning, the control rights of state-owned enterprises should be correctly allocated,otherwise, depends strengthening the principal's control rights may be have negative effective.

关 键 词：国有企业 企业控制权冲突 会计信息质量 市场业绩 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]