中国式分权下的地方政府干预与控制权转移绩效  

A Study on Performance Influence of Fiscal Decentralization and Local Government Intervention on Firms' Control Transfer

作　　者：邓可斌[1] 李智鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学财经学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2014年第4期89-98,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金项目(71003030);广东高校优秀青年创新人才培养项目(WYN09095)

摘　　要：以2006—2008年深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所发生控制权转移的135家目标上市公司为样本,尝试给出中国式分权环境下地方政府干预行为对控制权转移后企业绩效影响的经验证据。研究发现:与控制权转移前1年相比,控制权转移后目标上市公司的综合绩效得分在3年内均能够得到显著的提升,但控制权转移当年的地方政府对经济的干预度越高,控制权转移后3年内的绩效提升作用就越不明显。这说明,地方政府干预对企业变更控制权后的绩效提升起到了负面的抑制作用。因而,尽量降低地方政府对经济的干预动机,是控制权转移市场有效发挥作用的重要前提。The role of local government intervention in local economy under the background of decentralization reform is not fully studied in existing researches of Chinese companies＇ performance in control transfer. Based on the data of 135 target listed companies, which control right are transferred from 2006 to 2008 in Shenzhen Stock Exchange or Shanghai Stock Exchange, this paper attempts to give empirical evidences of how local government intervention influence companies＇ performance after control transfer under circumstance of Chinese style decentralization. The result shows that compare to the performance in 1 year before control transfer happen, target listed companies overall performance score has been significantly improved in 3 years after control transfer. But the stronger the local government intervention in economy in the year of control transfer, the more likely the in- crease of overall performance score in 3 years after control transfer become less significant. This means local government intervention has negative effect in the increase of companies＇ performance after control transfer. Accordingly, trying to lower the motive of local government intervention to economy is the important prerequisite for market of control transfer to function effectively.

关 键 词：控制权转移 企业绩效 财政分权 地方政府干预 财政改革 控制权市场 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]