基于博弈论的Web服务信任评估模型  

Web Service Trust Evaluation Model Based on Game Theory

作　　者：申利民[1,2] 王倩[1] 李峰[3] 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学信息科学与工程学院,河北秦皇岛066004 [2]河北省计算机虚拟技术与系统集成重点实验室,河北秦皇岛066004 [3]东北大学秦皇岛分校计算机与通信工程学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《小型微型计算机系统》2014年第8期1687-1692,共6页Journal of Chinese Computer Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(61272125)资助;教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科(20121333110014)资助;河北省自然科学基金和教育厅重点项目(F2011203234)资助

摘　　要：针对现有的信任评估模型中存在的共谋问题,提出一种基于博弈论的、具有激励机制的Web服务信任评估模型.该模型通过收集用户对Web服务的交互满意度累积服务的信任值,对Web服务的策略进行分析,利用博弈论的方法建立合理的信任评估机制,模型充分考虑了用户的行为对评估结果的影响,并通过对恶意服务的信任值进行合理的调整实现惩罚奖励措施,克服了传统模型中对不同信任度的服务进行惩罚时粒度不合理的缺陷,并由博弈过程推导出的纳什均衡的存在性和最优性说明了模型的合理性.实验结果表明,该模型能够有效的抵制共谋行为,提高用户参与信任评估的积极性,改善Web服务的运行环境.Based on the Game Theory, a trust evaluation model of Web service with incentive mechanism is proposed to solve the col- lusion problem that exist in the current trust evaluation The strategy of Web Service is analyzed by collecting the accumulated trust val- ue for user＇s interactive satisfaction. The model with reasonable trust evaluation mechanism is established by Game Theory to evaluate the influence of the evaluation result by user behavior. The unreasonable defect that exists in tradition model to punish the web serv- ices of different trust value is improved by the rationality adjustments to the trust value of the malicious service to achieve the punish- ment incentives. At last, the rationality of the model is proved by the existence and optimality of Nash equilibrium deduced by Game process. Experimental results show that the model can effectively resist the collusive behavior, raise the enthusiasm of users and im- prove the operating environment of Web services.

关 键 词：WEB服务 信任评估 博弈论 纳什均衡 共谋 

分 类 号：TP311[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论]