基于CVaR的供应链联合促销的回购契约协调研究  

Buy-back Contracts for a Supply Chain with a Risk-neutral Supplier and a Risk-averse Retailer Who Take Joint Promotion Actions based on CVaR

作　　者：代建生[1] 孟卫东[2] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2014年第7期43-51,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71362025;71262029);昆明理工大学人才培养基金资助项目(KKSY201408067)

摘　　要：运用CVaR方法,考察了风险中性的供应商和风险规避的销售商联合促销报童类商品的供应链的回购契约协调问题,从讨论中获得一些管理启示。讨论了既定回购契约下渠道成员的最优决策,并分析了回购契约参数、销售商风险规避系数、商品残值和缺货成本等外生参数对渠道成员决策的影响。研究表明传统回购契约不能完成渠道协调,但引入成本分担机制的回购契约能协调不过于规避风险的供应链;指出商品残值和缺货成本对上述结论没有影响,但它们对契约选择空间和能被回购契约协调的供应链的范围具有重要影响。最后,对文中主要结论进行了数值分析。Based on CVaR risk measure criterion, the issue is discussed in this paper, that whether or not buy-back contract can coordinate supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer who take joint promotion actions to sell newsboy goods. Some of management enlightenment is attained. Channel members optimal decision-making is explored under a given buy-back contract arrangement, and how exogenous parameters, such as buy-back contract parameters, risk aversion coefficient of the retailer, sal- vage value and shortage cost and so on, affect the optimal decision-making is also investigated. It shows that buy-back contracts, by introducing cost-sharing mechanism, can coordinate not-too-risk-averse supply chains, which cannot be coordinated by conventional buy-back contracts. In particular, salvage value and shortage cost have no effect on the above-mentioned conclusions. However, they exert important impacts on feasible space of buy-back contracts and what supply chain can be coordinated by buyback contracts. The main conclusions are verified by means of numerical analysis.

关 键 词：供应链 回购契约 联合促销 CVAR 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] F274