政府干预、煤企纵向一体化与并购绩效——基于社会责任观的经验证据  

Government Intervention,Coal Enterprise Vertical Integration and M&A Performance:An Empirical Evidence Based on Social Responsibility Perspective

作　　者：孙自愿[1] 卫慧芳[1] 梁庆平[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《中国矿业大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第3期66-73,共8页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(项目编号:12BGL044);国家社科基金重大项目"我国矿产资源跨期优化配置机制研究"(项目编号:11&ZD163);中国博士后科学基金项目(项目编号:20110491491);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(项目编号:11YJA790137)

摘　　要：结合政府频频出台政策,鼓励产业并购整合的宏观背景,在构建纵向一体化测算模型的基础上,从社会责任观视角构建了囊括经济、安全、生态和法律四个方面的并购社会绩效评价体系,运用面板数据实证分析了政府干预对煤企纵向一体化进程及其并购绩效的影响。研究结果表明,政府干预与煤炭企业纵向一体化程度正相关;多数煤企纵向一体化中注重经济绩效和安全绩效,忽略了生态环保和法律绩效。通过分析不同产权的并购特征,发现政府干预存在"产权偏好",且政府干预下国有煤炭企业并购社会绩效优于非国有煤炭企业。Against the macroscopic background of the government introducing policies encouraging industry＇s merger and acquisition （ M＆A ）, the present paper, based on building a vertical integration calculation model, constructs a system for evaluating coal enterprises＇ M ＆ A performance from four aspects of economy, security, ecology and law. With the panel data, the paper makes an empiracal analysis of the influence of government intervention on vertical integration process and the M ＆ A performance. The findings show that government intervention has the positive correlation with the degree of vertical integration in coal enterprises. The majority of coal enterprises emphasize economic and safety performance in vertical integration process while ignoring the environmental protection and legal performance. By analyzing the M＆A characteristics of different properties, the authors also find that preference of ＂property rights＂ exists in government intervention and that with this intervention the M ＆ A social performance of state-owned coal enterprises are superior to that of non-state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：政府干预 并购绩效 社会责任 

分 类 号：F407.21[经济管理—产业经济]