基于价格折扣的有条件延期支付策略  

Determination of conditional delay in payment policy based on price discount

作　　者：王宜举[1] 孟凡秀[1] 

机构地区：[1]曲阜师范大学管理学院,山东日照276800

出　　处：《控制与决策》2014年第8期1413-1418,共6页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(11171180)

摘　　要：在延期支付及价格折扣策略下,建立以供货商为主导的主从斯坦伯格模型,从供货商的角度研究基于价格折扣的有条件延期支付策略设置问题.通过对模型的理论分析和模型求解,给出了各情形下供货商的延期支付策略、零售商的最佳订单量和货款的最佳支付时间.数值结果表明,此策略在激励零售商加大订单量的同时,还能吸引其尽早交付货款,从而加快供货商的资金周转,实现双赢.Under the strategy that the supplier provides a delay in payment and a price discount to the retailer, a supplier-Stackelberg game model is established for the problem of determining the trade credit policy. Based on the theoretical analysis and computing the model, the supplier’s optimal conditional trade credit policy, the retailer’s optimal order quality and optimal payment time are presented. The presented numerical experiments show that this conditional trade credit policy can not only stimulate the retailer to make a larger order, but also attract the retailer to pay for his purchases earlier. Hence, it can accelerate the supplier’s capital turnover and realize a win-win outcome.

关 键 词：有条件延期支付 价格折扣 斯坦伯格模型 补货策略 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]