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机构地区:[1]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710055
出 处:《西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版)》2014年第3期449-453,共5页Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基 金:陕西省教育厅科研计划基金项目(12JZ013)
摘 要:Shapley值法是进行利益分配的一种有效方法,能有效考虑参与方的利益贡献度进行利益的合理分配.首先对公共建设项目参与三方的利益进行分析,然后在工期与参与方合作行为的假定关系上定量化分析工期与成本收益之间的关系,利用Shapley值设计出一种利益分享机制,以解决公共建设项目参与三方合作博弈下的收益分配,有利于激励参与方的合作行为.最后通过实例证明该种分配方式能较好的激励项目参与各方选择合作的行为.本文的研究对于有效促进公共建设项目参与各方的充分合作,提高公共建设项目的工期管理水平有着积极的意义.Shapley value is an effective method for benefits distribution, which can take the contribution to the benefits of every participant into consideration when allocating the interests. This article includes three aspects. Firstly, a benefit analysis of the three participators in public construction project. Secondly, a quantitative analysis about the relationship between schedule and cost, on the assumption that the cooperative behaviors can affect the schedule. To solve the income distribution in tripartite cooperative game so as to encourage the cooperate behaviors in public construction project. Finally, an example was provided to prove that the distribu- tion method can make the cooperative behaviors good choice for the participants, as it turns out that everyone can benefit more in this choice. This study has an positive meaning for the effective promotion of cooperation behaviors of all parties involved in public construction projects, as well as for improving the management level on schedule in public construction projects.
分 类 号:TU712[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]
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