新型城镇化下我国留地安置制度的博弈分析  

Game relationship analysis of the land resettlement system under continuing urbanization in China

作　　者：韩璐[1] 鲍海君[1] 徐保根[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学不动产研究所,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《上海国土资源》2014年第3期27-30,共4页Shanghai Land & Resources

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(41371187);浙江省自然科学基金(LY13D010004);浙江省钱江人才计划C类项目(QJC1202019);杭州市哲学社会科学规划课题(B13GL11Q);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Y201225542)

摘　　要：基于博弈理论,以杭州留地安置制度为例,分析中央与地方政府在土地制度中的关系,并提出化解矛盾与冲突的政策建议,为新型城镇化下我国土地制度改革提供决策依据。分析研究表明,杭州留地安置制度既在中央与地方政府的博弈关系中起积极作用,又在用途、利益主体、制度效力等方面在中央与地方政府间存在目标差异性冲突。因此建议,关注中央与地方政府土地制度中的利益关系;建立地方政府可持续发展的综合指标政绩考核机制;改革中央和地方的财政分配制度;注重农民参与,维护农民土地合法权利。To provide a decision-making basis for the land reform system under continuing urbanization, and using Hangzhou city as an example, the relationship between central and local government in the land resettlement system is analyzed based on game theory. Policy recommendations are proposed to resolve the conlfict between central and local governments in the land resettlement system. The results show that on the one hand, land resettlement in Hangzhou plays an active role in the game relationship between central and local governments. On the other hand, the conlfict of differences in objectives between central and local governments is revealed with respect to purpose, stakeholders, and institutional effectiveness. The study concludes the fol owing:central and local governments should be concerned with the land system, the performance evaluation mechanism of integrated indicators should be established for the sustainable development of local government, the ifnancial distribution system of both central and local governments should be reformed, farmer participation should be emphasized, and the legitimate rights of farmers’ land should be protected.

关 键 词：土地产权 留地安置制度 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F301.1[经济管理—产业经济]