战略顾客行为对竞争性供应链绩效的影响  

Effects of strategic consumer behavior on competing supply chain performance

作　　者：杨光勇[1] 计国君[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2014年第8期1998-2006,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71201138;71371159);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(12YJC630264);福建省自然科学基金(2012J01304)

摘　　要：战略顾客利用等待跨期选择购买时机以实现其期望剩余最大化,其支付意愿由横向支付意愿与纵向支付意愿构成.考虑了存在产品差异与供应合同条款差异的两条竞争性供应链.每条供应链中,制造商向零售商提供两类供应合同:批发价格合同与销售补偿合同.结论表明:1)当产品间只存在横向差异性时,纵向联盟同时降低了自身供应链与竞争供应链的绩效,即相对于都采用批发价格合同情形,两条供应链都采用销售补偿合同时,各自得到的期望利润更低.2)当产品间同时存在横向与纵向差异性时,供应链提升产品纵向差异优势与采用纵向联盟能增加自身期望利润,却降低了竞争供应链的绩效.Strategic consumers utilize waiting and choose optimal inter-temporal purchase timing tomaximize their expected surplus. Strategic consumer willingness to pay is composed of two componentshorizontal and vertical willingness to pay. This paper considers two competing supply chains based onproduct and supply contract terms differentiation. Within each of the supply chains, manufacturer providestwo types of supply contracts to retailer, i.e., wholesale price contract and sale rebate contract. Ourconclusions show that when products are horizontal, vertical coordination between ownerships decreasesthe supply chain performance. That is, compared to wholesale price contract, if both supply chains adoptsales rebate contract, expected profits achieved by each is lower. When products are both horizontal andvertical, a supply chain improving product vertical differentiation advantage and vertically coordinate canimprove its expected profits, but is damaging to rival supply chain performance.

关 键 词：战略顾客行为 竞争性供应链 产品性能支付意愿 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]