政府监管视角下垄断行为与惩罚性损害赔偿制度关系研究  

作　　者：朱相宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工业大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2014年第8期149-152,共4页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"我国科技服务业自主创新体系国际化发展模式与政策选择研究"(批准号:14CGL003);中国博士后科学基金项目"我国对国外专利池反垄断的决策方法体系及实证研究"(批准号:2013M530549)

摘　　要：通过构建政府和垄断企业之间、受害企业和垄断企业之间的反垄断与垄断行为博弈模型,研究政府监管视角下的垄断行为产生的主要影响因素,结果显示:垄断行为的产生主要受罚款额度占企业销售收入的比例、参与反垄断行为的主体数量以及对受害主体的赔偿倍数等因素的影响,结合对惩罚性损害赔偿内涵的界定,分析惩罚性损害赔偿制度对规制垄断行为的作用。通过分析其他国家和地区惩罚性赔偿制度在反垄断立法和执法中的实践,对所得结论做进一步论证。The paper builds two game models of anti - monopoly and monopoly behaviors between government and monopoly enterprise and between injured enterprise and monopoly enterprise. By the two models, it studies the main impact factors of monopoly behavior from the perspective of government regulations. The result shows that monopoly behavior is mainly impacted by fines ratio in total sales revenue, the number of subjects participating in anti - monopoly and the multiple of compensation for the victims. With the connotation of the punitive damage, it analyzes the role of punitive damage system to regulate the monopoly behavior, and makes a further argument by analyzing the practice of the punitive damage in anti - monopoly legislation and law enforcement in other countries and regions.

关 键 词：垄断行为 惩罚性损害赔偿 博弈论 影响因素 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]