环保考核、地方官员晋升与环境治理——基于2004—2009年中国86个重点城市的经验证据  

Environmental Assessment,Local Official Promotion and Environmental Management——Empirical Evidence from 86 Main Cities of China( 2004- 2009)

作　　者：孙伟增[1] 罗党论[2] 郑思齐[1] 万广华 

机构地区：[1]清华大学建设管理系 [2]中山大学岭南学院 [3]亚洲开发银行

出　　处：《清华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第4期49-62,171,共14页Journal of Tsinghua University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70973065和71273154);教育部新世纪人才支持计划(NCET-12-0313);国家社会科学基金重大项目(09&ZD042);清华大学自主科研计划

摘　　要：长期以来,由于官员过度追求以经济增长为主的晋升激励指标,在经济飞速发展的同时,环境污染和能源消耗也愈加严重。随着中央对地方官员的考核机制的科学化,以环境质量和能源利用效率改善为核心的环保考核对地方官员的晋升概率已经具有一定的正向作用,并且在大城市和政府行政力量较强的城市这种作用更加显著。这种考核机制的变化能够有效促进中国城市经济增长的可持续性。特别是在大城市和政府行政力量较强的城市,单位GDP能耗和环境污染水平都将更早地跨过环境库兹涅茨曲线(EKC)的拐点,环境质量改善的前景更加乐观。除此之外,地方官员受教育水平和民众受教育水平对于城市的可持续发展也具有积极的作用。In the past,due to the excessive pursuit of political promotion incentive based on economic growth by local officials,China experienced a rapid economic growth,but meanwhile the environmental pollution and energy consumption has become even more serious. With the evaluation mechanism of local officials becomes more scientific,the environmental assessment which mainly consists of the improvement of environment quality and energy efficiency already have some positive effect on the probability of local official promotion; and in larger cities or cities with stronger executive power,the effect is more significant. The changes effectively promote the sustainable economic growth in urban China. In addition,the education level of local officials and publics also has a positive effect on the improvement of environment quality of the city.

关 键 词：地方官员 经济增长 单位GDP能耗 环境污染 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] D262.3[政治法律—政治学]