反补贴及其利益度量基准的经济学分析  

The Countervailing Duty and Its Benchmark for the Subsidy Calculation: An Economic Analysis

作　　者：张斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《国际商务研究》2014年第5期14-25,共12页International Business Research

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目"反补贴价格比较基准问题研究"(项目编号:11BGJ012)

摘　　要：多边反补贴制度的本质旨在中和成员方补贴政策对进口国产业的贸易条件外部性,但在贸易救济实践中,反补贴措施却被当作实现全球资源有效配置的手段,因而利益度量采用无政府干预的市场基准。但是,基于市场基准以接受者所获利益计算补贴金额方法存在与多边反补贴制度设计初衷的非一致性和基准规则自身的适用冲突,而采用涉案产品厂商成本或国内价格作为度量基准,不仅缓解上述困境,而且简化"双反"调查程序,且与现行多边规则的相关规定和实践在逻辑上亦完全一致。The multilateral regulation for countervailing duties is designed to neutralize the terms-of-trade externalities of a foreign member＇s subsidy policy on the importing member＇s domestic industry. In trade remedy practice, countervailing duties are used to promote efficient allocation of global resources, and thus the benchmark from a market without government intervention applies in the subsidy calculation. But such a pure market-based benchmark methodology contradicts the intention of the multilateral countervailing regulation and can lead to the conflict of the benchmark rule itself. To solve the problem, the cost or domestic price of the product under investigation can be used as the proper benchmark, which will not only simplify the antidumping and countervailing investigation procedures, but is also logically consistent with the current countervailing duty rules.

关 键 词：反补贴 利益度量 基准 

分 类 号：F741.2[经济管理—国际贸易]