打开非相关多元化与企业创新投入关系的黑箱——基于经理自主权的分析  

Open the Black Box of Firms' Non-related Diversification and Innovation Investment—— Analysis Based on the Managerial Discretion

作　　者：许春[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京211106

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2014年第4期1-11,共11页R&D Management

基　　金：南京航空航天大学基本科研专项项目"企业技术合作契约关系型治理研究"(NR2011010);江苏省教育厅高校哲社基金"企业技术合作外部治理机制理论和实证研究"(2011SJD630013)

摘　　要：使用世行对中国企业的调查数据深入分析经理自主权在中国企业非相关多元化战略与企业创新投入之间的作用机制.研究发现,非相关多元化程度较高的中国企业,企业经理的自主权受到更为严格的控制;经理自主权越低,企业创新投入越高.经理自主权受到限制,会使经理减少规避创新风险的行为、促进企业创新投入.经理自主权作为中介变量显著影响了非相关多元化与企业创新投入之间的关系.It analysed the effect of the managerial discretion on the relationship between the Chinese firms＇ non-related diversification strategy and innovation investment based on the data collected by World Bank Organization. The empiri- cal analysis finds that： The managerial discretion will be much more constrained in the Chinese firms with higher degree of non-related diversification; The lower the managerial discretion, the more innovation investment. The constrained managerial discretion will hinder the managers＇ effort of avoiding innovation risk and force them to increase innovation investment. The managerial discretion acts as a moderating variable that significantly influences the relationship between the finns＇ non-related diversification strategy and innovation investment.

关 键 词：非相关多元化 经理自主权 企业创新密度 M型组织结构 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济]