Study on the Price Design and Contract Stability of "Company + Farmer" Model with Time Preference under Double Moral Hazards  

双重道德风险下具有时间偏好的“公司+农户”价格设计与契约稳定性研究（英文）

作　　者：高阔[1] 甘筱青[1] 

机构地区：[1]九江学院,江西九江332005

出　　处：《Agricultural Science & Technology》2014年第8期1424-1427,共4页农业科学与技术（英文版）

基　　金：Supported by Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education(12YJC630050);Soft Science Bidding Project of Ministry of Agriculture(20140203);Jiangxi Soft Science Fund(20141BBA10065);Jiangxi’s Jiangxi Provincial Education Department(GJJ13727)~~

摘　　要：The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.分析了"公司+农户"模式存在的双重道德风险及公司和农户的时间偏好成本,通过静态博弈模型揭示"公司+农户"模式履约率不高的原因在于市场风险的存在,即市场价格的波动,契约稳定的市场价格是一个区间而非一个特定数值。同时分析违约金额、市场交易成本和时间偏好成本对契约稳定的价格区间幅度的影响,发现违约金额、市场交易成本和时间偏好成本正向影响契约稳定的价格区间幅度。

关 键 词：＂Company＋ farmer＂ Double moral hazard Time preference Price design Contract stability 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F321.42F323.7