委托—代理视角下业主与PMC承包商风险分摊模型  

Risk Sharing Model between the Owner and the PMC Contractor from Principal-agent Perspective

作　　者：石林林[1] 丰景春[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院项目管理信息化研究所,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2014年第4期36-41,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金："十一五"国家科技支撑计划重大项目(2006BAB04A13);国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZD108);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金(07SJD630006)

摘　　要：PMC承包商与业主之间的合同一般采用成本加激励酬金合同,合同金额由成本、酬金、与风险有关的奖励/惩罚等3部分组成,其中,酬金和奖惩费用与风险密切相关。从经济学的委托—代理角度出发,分析了业主与PMC承包商的风险选择和行为,研究了业主与PMC承包商在信息对称和不对称条件下的风险分摊率,构建了业主与PMC承包商风险分摊应用模型,从激励机制、监理、PMC承包商融资、市场监督机制等4个方面分析如何使业主降低风险分摊和获得更多的项目节余。基于风险分摊率确定合理的激励强度,为签订合同激励机制提供依据,也为双方作为利益共同体为完成项目各自承担相应的风险提出建议。PMC contract between the contractor and the owners generally is cost plus incentive fee contract,which consists of costs,fees,and risks related reward/punishment. From the perspective of economics,risk and behavior of owners and the PMC contractors are analyzed. Under the conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information,risk-sharing rate is explored and a risk sharing model is built. From respectives of incentives,supervision,PMC Contractor financing,market surveillance mechanisms, how to make the owners reduce risk sharing and get more savings projects are discussed. Some suggestions are presented for contract signing.

关 键 词：PMC模式 委托-代理 风险分摊 模型 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]