政府投资代建制项目监管的动态博弈研究  

Supervision Dynamic Game of Construction-agent System Project

作　　者：姚尧[1] 郭志达[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连交通大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116028

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2014年第4期52-56,共5页Journal of Engineering Management

摘　　要：代建制作为我国投资体制改革的新兴产物,具有传统管理模式不可比拟的优势,同时也存在特有的弊端,因此需要政府进行有效的监管。在综合分析政府投资代建制项目建设过程中政府、代建单位和承建单位三者相互关系的基础上,根据公共寻租理论,分析代建单位与承建单位发生寻租行为的动机;运用博弈论方法建立政府投资项目代建制下三方博弈的动态模型,并对代建单位与承建单位的寻租行为进行博弈分析;根据模型分析结论,从政府监管角度提出了科学治理寻租行为的政策建议和改革措施。Construction-agent system is emerging with the reform of investment system in China,which contains many incomparable advantages to the traditional management pattern,and it has some specific disadvantages which need effective supervision from government agency. According to rent-seeking theory,the rent-seeking incentives of construction agency and construction firm are analyzed based on the synthetic analysis on the interrelationship among the government,construction agency and construction firm.A tripartite dynamic game model is established based on game theory,and the rent-seeking motives between construction agency and construction firm are analyzed. According to the results of the model,it is suggested that the government should make scientific policies and measures to restrain the rent-seeking behaviors.

关 键 词：政府投资 代建制项目 项目监管 寻租行为 动态博弈 

分 类 号：TU712[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]