“部门化”城市管理体制下“所有者缺位”问题及其治理  

“Owner Absence”of“Departmentalization”City Management System and Its Governance

作　　者：方远[1] 方付建[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南民族大学湖北民族地区经济社会发展研究中心,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《安徽行政学院学报》2014年第4期102-106,共5页Journal of Anhui Academy of Governance

摘　　要：为了解部门化城市管理制度下的"所有者缺位"问题,文章把城市管理权力作为一种资本,将参与城市管理的主体作为资本行为者,引入城市管理效用的边际替代率分析,探寻部门化管理机制何以导致城市管理所有者缺位。研究表明,由于部门的简单细化,出现部门管理资源禀赋差异,进而导致城市管理行为出现分化,如职能部门间不均衡,参与主体间失衡等,从而产生城市管理的"所有者缺位"问题。而应对此问题,需在法理层面、制度层面、意识层面和操作层面上做出相关对策探讨。To understand“owner absence”of departmentalization city management system, in this paper, the urban management right is as a kind of capital,the main body of urban management is as an act of using the capital,and the marginal rate of substitution analysis of urban management utility is introduced ,to find out how the government departmentalization management mechanism leads to urban management owner absence. From the analysis ,the simple refining sector results in the management resources endowment,leading to urban management behavior’s differentiation,performance in the disparity among the functional departments ,and management involved in the imbalance among the players ,eventually“the owner absence”of urban management appears. In the face of this problem,at the legal level,system level,the consciousness and operating level the relevant countermeasures are discussed.

关 键 词：部门化 所有者缺位 边际替代率 多元协同治理 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]