基于非零和博弈的快件检验监管困境的研究  

Research on Regulatory of Inspection and Quarantine Based on Non-zero Game

作　　者：刘琳[1] 林国龙[1] 马占鑫[1] 丁一[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学物流研究中心,上海201306

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2014年第23期130-134,共5页Science Technology and Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71301101);教育部博士点基金项目(20113121120002)资助

摘　　要：检验检疫是国际贸易中的重要环节,重点是要提高整个检验链的工作效率和国际贸易供应链的效率。检验链上的检验方和多方被检之间的非零和博弈模型中引入信用等级打分的机制,将利用信用度的不同和成本因素综合考虑,旨在解决有限的预算下资源的分配问题。求解出非零和博弈模型的纳什均衡解,从不同的阶段,对不同的预算进行分析得到给定参与者不同预算下的纳什均衡,以助于解决资源限定下的资源分配问题。Inspection and quarantine is a very important active in international business. The main point is to discuss on the efficiency improvement of the inspection chain and supply chain in international trade. A non-zero game model between inspectees and inspector are considered with credit rating in the model. The model will consider the credit rating level and the cost of inspection act to solve the arrangement of resource on limit budget. All the Nash equilibriums of the non-zero game can be found in different budget. This solution could help the decision maker to figure out the way to allocate limit resources appropriately.

关 键 词：检验链 非零和博弈 监管困境 信用等级 

分 类 号：X924.3[环境科学与工程—安全科学]