大股东控制与外部审计治理——股票全流通时代的经验证据  

The Control of Large Shareholder and the Governance of External Audit——Empirical Evidence Based on the Data of the Stock Entire Circulation Time

作　　者：张利红[1] 刘国常[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江师范大学经管学院,浙江金华321004 [2]广东财经大学会计学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2014年第9期113-124,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13CGL050);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC790122)

摘　　要：以2007~2011年沪深两市发生减持的A股公司为样本，探讨了大股东在减持和掏空上市公司以获取控制权私人收益的过程中，外部审计是否发挥了应有的监督和约束作用。研究发现，大股东减持力度越大，公司盈余管理越严重，外部审计签发非标准审计意见的概率就越低；大股东减持力度越大，掏空越严重，外部审计签发非标准审计意见的概率也越低。这一结果表明，由于我国的投资者保护较弱，在股票全流通时代，大股东为了最大化控制权私人收益，存在“购买”审计意见的可能，并且“购买”审计意见的主要目的是获取更大的减持收益。Using 2007-2011 A shares data in Shanghai and Shenzhen market as a sample, this paper diseusses whether external audit play the supervision and restriction functions in the case that large shareholders obtain private benefits of control by tunneling and reducing their share of listed companies. This study found that, the greater the strength of large shareholders to reduce their shares, the more serious of earnings management, the lower probability that external audit issuing non-standard audit opinion. Research results show that, in Chinese weak investor protection environment and in the stock entire circulation time, in order to realize the maximization of private benefits of control, large shareholders may ＂buy＂ audit opinion to obtain greater returns from reducing stocks.

关 键 词：大股东减持 大股东掏空行为 盈余管理 外部审计 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]