不同博弈框架下的双渠道供应链联盟模式选择  

Choice of dual channel supply chain alliance mode in different framework of game theory

作　　者：浦徐进 诸葛瑞杰 曹文彬 

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第8期1002-1007,共6页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371086);江苏省哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(10JD024)

摘　　要：文章构建了1个供应商和2个零售商组成的供应链博弈模型,在非合作博弈框架下对比分析了不同联盟模式下供应商、零售商和供应链整体的利润变化情况,同时探讨了基于合作博弈下的Shapley值法设计出合理的利润分配机制,实现整体联盟模式合作稳定的可能性。结果表明:在非合作博弈框架下,供应商和零售商各自偏好于不同的联盟模式,供应链整体利润不能实现最大化;在合作博弈框架下,当价格敏感系数与零售商间敏感系数的比值满足一定条件时,基于Shapley值法设计的利润分配机制是保障自愿合作、实现供应链整体利润最大化的有效途径。A game model of supply chain consisting of a supplier and tw o retailers is built , then under the framework of non-cooperative game ,the changes of supplier profits ,retailers profits and overall profit of the supply chain under different alliance modes are analyzed .The reasonable profit distribution mechanism under the framework of cooperative game is designed based on Shapley value method to achieve the possibility of co -operation stability in the overall alliance mode .The results show that ,under the framework of non-coopera-tive game ,suppliers and retailers respectively prefer different modes of alliance and the overall profit of the supply chain may not reach maximization ;under the framework of cooperative game ,when the ratio of the price-sensitive coefficient to the sensitive coefficient between retailers reaches certain degree ,the profit distri-bution mechanism based on the Shapley value method is an effective method to protect voluntary cooperation and to achieve the overall profit maximization of supply chain .

关 键 词：供应链联盟 非合作博弈 合作博弈 SHAPLEY值法 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]