基于Cournot模型的四种市场二度价格歧视博弈分析  

Analysis on Second-Degree Price Discrimination in All Four Kinds of Markets Based on Game Theory and Cournot Model

作　　者：高兴佑[1] 

机构地区：[1]曲靖师范学院,云南曲靖655011

出　　处：《廊坊师范学院学报（自然科学版）》2014年第4期5-9,15,共6页Journal of Langfang Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：在线性需求函数条件下,对m个厂商n段定价实施二度价格歧视,对以最大化各自收益的均衡分段点的分布规律进行了完全信息静态博弈分析。研究结果表明:m个厂商n段定价实施二度价格歧视,收益最大化的必要条件是,对需求量进行分段,使各段长度成公比为1/m的等比数列。从最一般的意义上给出了全部四种市场类型在二度价格歧视下的均衡歧视产量、均衡歧视价格和市场均衡歧视总收益的统一计算公式,并详细分析了其性质。Under the condition of linear demand function, the distribution law of equilibrium segment points of firms enforcing second-degree price discrimination to maximize respective revenues is analyzed in the case of m firms with n intervals pricing by using complete information static game theory. The results show that： when m firms divide demand to enforce second-degree price discrimination, the necessary condition of revenue maximization is to divide demand into some intervals and let the length of each interval become geometric series, whose common ratio is 1/m. The unified formula of equilibrium production, equilibrium price and market equilibrium total revenue of all four types of markets under the condition of second-degree price discrimination are presented in the most general sense, furthermore, the nature of which are analyzed in detail.

关 键 词：二度价格歧视 完全信息静态博弈 线性需求 古诺模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]