基于有限理性的工程质量监督管理  

Engineering Quality Supervision Management Based on Bounded Rationality

作　　者：施建刚[1] 孔庆山[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第8期1273-1279,共7页Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金(12YJA630099);国家自然科学青年基金(71301065)

摘　　要：在有限理性分析框架下构建了监管部门和承包商群体之间的演化博弈模型,分析了群体策略的动态演化.研究发现在监管部门和承包商随机配对的质量监管博弈中,最终会出现监管失效现象.为了分析这种现象产生的原因,对承包商群体内部的质量竞争博弈展开研究,发现过高和过低的惩罚费用都不利于质量监管系统的有效运转,引入外部激励改变群体策略的演化方向从而实现监管目标是提高工程质量监管绩效的有效途径.发现对于某一承包商的质量监管激励会对其他承包商的质量行为产生威慑效应,对质量欺骗净收益较大的承包商实施质量监管激励可以有效提高监管绩效.最后找到了使总激励费用最小的策略组合,实现了工程质量监管系统的优化.In the perspective of bounded rationality,this paper develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary directions of groups＇ behavior.Research findings indicate that there is a phenomenon of ＂invalidation of management＂ and the further analyses disclose that too high or too low penalty fee of quality competition is not good for the effective operation of the quality supervision system.By introducing the external incentive,we can change the evolutionary directions of the group strategy and find effective method to enhance quality management performance of the project.The study finds that for a certain contractor＇s quality supervision incentive can bring the deterrent effect to other contractor＇s quality behavior,to incentive the quality supervision of the contractor whose income is larger can enhance the performance of supervision.Finally,we use the deterrent effect to find the minimum cost of incentive strategy combination and achieve the system optimization of project quality management.

关 键 词：质量监管 有限理性 演化稳定策略 外部激励 群体博弈 

分 类 号：C931.2[经济管理—管理学]