基于代理人市场—声誉模型的医生道德风险治理研究  

Studying on the control of doctors' moral hazard based on agent market-reputation model

作　　者：徐梦丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东药学院药科学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2014年第8期600-602,共3页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：广东高校优秀青年创新人才培养计划项目(育苗工程项目)"广州市涉农地区精神病患者合理用药调查分析及干预评价"(编号:2012WYM 0083)

摘　　要：医疗服务市场具有医患双方利益不一致性、信息不对称性、医疗服务不确定性等特性,这将导致作为患者代理人的医生可能产生道德风险。近年来,"看病贵"问题与医疗服务市场中的医生道德风险——医生诱导患者需求不无关系,具体表现过度检查、过度用药等行为。文章首先阐述了医生道德风险的概念及其产生的条件,然后将代理人市场—声誉模型引入到医患委托代理博弈过程中,并基于该模型的声誉激励机制,提出了医生道德风险治理的政策建议。The medical service market has the characteristics of inconsistency of mutual interests between doctors and patients,information asymmetry,and uncertainty of medical services,which may lead to the doctors＇ moral hazard.In recent years,the problem of expensive medical treatment was close related with the doctors＇ moral hazard,which embodied as excessive examination,excessive drug-use,etc.The concept and conditions of doctors＇ moral hazard were expounded.Then the agent market-reputation model was introduced into the gaming process of principal-agent between doctors and patients.Based on the reputation incentive mechanism of this model,policy suggestions were put forward to prevent the doctors＇ moral hazard.

关 键 词：代理人市场—声誉模型 医生道德风险 声誉效应 

分 类 号：R194[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]