基于VCG-Kelly机制的钢铁企业能源分配的研究  

Research on Energy Allocation in Iron and Steel Enterprises Based on VCG-Kelly Mechanism

作　　者：马景富[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳理工大学信息科学与工程学院,辽宁沈阳110159

出　　处：《信息技术与信息化》2014年第4期239-241,共3页Information Technology and Informatization

摘　　要：钢铁企业能源中心的主要目标是确保生产用能的稳定供应和动态调配。为了抑制二级厂自私性行为,提出了基于VCG-Kelly机制的能源分配机制。该机制具有占优策略激励兼容特性,且只需一维竞价信息。仿真结果表明,本文所提出的分配机制通过有效的价格惩罚,使自私二级厂主动地选择真实的能源需求策略,抑制其说谎的动机,进而使能源能得到合理的分配。The primary aim of the energy center in the iron and steel enterprises is to ensure the stable supply and dynamic allocation of energy consumption in production. To restrict the secondary factories＇ selfishness, an energy allocation mechanism based on VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which has the dominated strategy incentive compatible property. Simulation results show that the selfish secondary factories do not have any incentives to lie and provide the real energy requirements, through the effective punishment scheme. As a result, the energy is allocated reasonably among the secondary factories.

关 键 词：钢铁企业 能源分配 VCG-Kelly机制 

分 类 号：TF083[冶金工程—冶金物理化学]