策略性信息泄露情形下的逆向供应链回收定价策略  

Recycling pricing strategy for reverse supply chain under strategic information leakage

作　　者：蹇明[1] 陈志刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2014年第8期2000-2007,共8页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CGL013);四川省科技规划资助项目(2009ZR0069);成都市科技计划资助项目(10RKYB092ZF)~~

摘　　要：为了更好地促进逆向供应链中的回收定价决策管理,考虑由一个制造商和两个第三方回收商组成的二级逆向供应链,其中两个第三方回收商之间存在不对称成本信息和回收价格静态博弈。以博弈论为基础,建立了具有价格竞争的两个回收商之间的静态定价决策模型、再制造商与回收商之间的动态定价模型,以及再制造商的信息泄露决策模型,在分析再制造商信息泄露产生机理的基础上给出了再制造商和第三方回收商的最优定价策略。研究表明:当在位回收商为高成本类型时,再制造商总会选择不将在位者的信息泄露给新进入回收商;而当在位回收商为低成本类型时,再制造商总会选择泄露信息的决策。To better facilitate the recycling pricing decision management in reverse supply chain, a two-echelon re- verse supply chain composed of a manufacturer and two third-party recyclers with asymmetric cost information and recycling price static game was considered. Based on the game theory, a pricing decision model for recyclers with static price game, a pricing decision model for the remanufacturer and recyclers with dynamic price game, and an in- formation leakage decision model for remanufacturer were established. The optimal recycling pricing strategy for the remanufacturer and third-party recyclers was given on the basis of analyzing generation mechanism of information leakage. The results showed that when the incumbent was high cost, the remanufacturer would not leak the incumbent＇s information to the entrant. Conversely, the remanufacturer would always leak the information under the low cost incumbent.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 第三方回收商 不对称成本信息 信息泄露 回收定价决策 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] O227[理学—运筹学与控制论]