银行风险行为监管研究  

A Study of the Supervision of Banks' Risk-taking Behaviors

作　　者：隋平[1] 马栋梁[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学法学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《郑州大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第5期44-48,共5页Journal of Zhengzhou University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：银行追求高风险会影响自身的稳定性,具有系统重要性的银行一旦破产,则会带来系统性危机,要解除这类危机,必须找出银行追求高风险的动机。正是银行破产给金融系统和社会经济造成的巨大损失作为其负外部性没有被银行所内化,银行的股东就产生了过高的风险欲求的动机。确立银行股东双倍责任制是将其负外部性内化的有效途径。The banks＇high- risk- seeking behaviors will affect their own stability. It is necessary to find out their motivation to run risks. The massive loss caused by bank failures to the financial system and social economy would not be intemalized by the bank due to its negative externality, and this is what motivate the excessive risk pursuance of the bank shareholders. The establishment of a double responsibility system on the bank shareholders is an effective way to internalize the bank＇s negative externality.

关 键 词：银行公司治理 风险欲求 双倍责任 风险控制 外部性 

分 类 号：D922.23[政治法律—经济法学]