试析甲午战争中清政府的政治动员  

On political mobilization of Qing government during the Sino-Japanese War of 1984-1985

作　　者：龙心刚[1] 肖焱[1] 谢春娅[1] 

机构地区：[1]海军工程大学理学院,武汉430033

出　　处：《海军工程大学学报（综合版）》2014年第3期14-18,共5页Journal of Naval University of Engineering(Comprehensive Edition)

摘　　要：政治动员是战争动员的重要组成部分。甲午战争期间,清政府进行了一系列政治动员活动,在局部范围内取得了一些成效。但相对于日本政治动员的效果,清政府仍具有全方位的差距,即存在体制落后、目标不明、手段单一等明显缺陷。正是缺乏有效的政治动员这个很容易被忽视,但又是最基本的条件,成为清政府输掉这场战争的重要原因。从中还可窥见清政府在洋务运动中的军事变革具有很大的不彻底性,只迈出了引进舰船、枪炮的第一步改革,而没有跟进更深入的体制变革与观念更新。Political mobilization is an indispensable part of war mobilization. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Qing government carried out a series of political mobilization activities, which achieved some success in the local range. But compared to the Japanese governmentrs political mobilization effect, the Qing government has a full range of gap and obvious defects, such as the backward system, the unknown target and the single means. Political mobilization, as the most basic condition and easily ignored factor, is actually an important reason to explain why the Qing government lost the war. It also reflects that the revolution in military affairs in Westernization Movement is not thorough. The Qing government only took the first reform step to import the ships and guns, but not made any follow-up system change and ideas renewal.

关 键 词：甲午战争 政治动员 战斗精神 爱国主义 

分 类 号：E295.2[军事—军事理论]