董事高管责任保险与公司绩效——基于中国A股上市公司的经验分析  

Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Firm Performance:Evidence from A- share Listed Companies in China

作　　者：胡国柳[1] 胡珺[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《经济评论》2014年第5期136-147,共12页Economic Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"高管过度自信扭曲投资的治理机制研究"(项目编号:71062009);教育部新世纪人才支持计划(项目编号:NCET-10-0123);海南大学"中西部高校综合能力提升计划"建设项目

摘　　要：引入董事高管责任保险能否提升公司绩效是国际金融与公司治理领域争议的热点话题。尽管国外学者对董事高管责任保险的经济效用进行了深入探讨,但基于中国资本市场上市公司的研究很少。本文以2007-2012年中国A股上市公司为样本,基于保险理论与公司治理理论框架剖析了上市公司是否引进董事高管责任保险及引进董事高管责任保险年限对公司绩效的影响。本文的实证研究结果表明:整体而言,引入董事高管责任保险有助于提升上市公司的市值与盈利水平;但随着认购年份增长,董事高管责任保险对公司市值及盈利能力的提升作用降低。本文的研究结论有助于加深我国上市公司及投资人对董事高管责任保险的认知与理解,为监管部门规范引导董事高管责任保险的使用提供了一定经验借鉴。Whether the introduction of Directors＇ and Officers＇ insurance （ ＂D＆O insurance＂ ） enhances the performance of listed companies is a hot topic in international finance and corporate governance. Despite many deep researches have been done by foreign scholars, however, few analyses are based on the evidence of listed companies in China. Employing A - share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 in China as the sample, this paper analyzes whether the introduction of D＆O insurance and the years of D＆O insurance has impacts on firm performance from the framework of insurance and corporate governance theory. Empirical evidence of the paper suggests that the introduction of D＆O insurance could enhance companies＇ market value and operation capacity, but the influence negatively relates to bought - years. The research conclusion has a positive effect for listed companies and investors on understanding D＆O insurance, and provides the experience reference for regulators to specify and guide the use of D＆O insurance.

关 键 词：董事高管责任保险 风险 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F842[经济管理—保险] F272.5