代际视角下矿产资源开发补偿的组合性均衡评价模型  

Combinational Equilibrium Evaluation Model of Compensation of Mineral Resources Exploitation from the Perspective of Intergeneration

作　　者：黄健柏[1] 王叶[2] 钟美瑞[1] 程慧[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学金属资源战略研究院,湖南长沙410083 [2]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《预测》2014年第5期71-75,80,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家社会科学重大资助项目(13&ZD024);教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(13YJAZH149);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171203);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20110491264)

摘　　要：针对矿产资源的耗竭性与不可再生性及在开发过程中的外部性,本文构建了一种可以评价其生产价值、产权价值、生态价值及代际补偿价值的组合性均衡评价模型。即用期权价值修正矿产资源开发补偿的基准值,修正内容包括矿产资源开发的不确定性及博弈主体的策略性价值,并用利他心理效用函数修正矿产开发中博弈主体的效用,体现矿产资源开发的代际补偿价值。以此为基础,构建基于贝叶斯规则及动态博弈均衡的矿产资源协议定价博弈模型,分析基准值及效用函数的修正如何影响博弈主体的策略选择及定价均衡。模型结果表明将期权价值和利他效用纳入组合性均衡评价模型后,增加了公司违规开采和所有者低价出售矿产资源的成本,资源代际配置倾向合理,从而实现矿产资源的可持续利用和社会福利的帕累托改进。Aiming at the exhaustion and the non-renewability of mineral resources as well as the externality problems in the process of exploitation, the paper builds a combinational equilibrium evaluation model which can evaluate production value, property value, ecological value and intergenerational compensation value. That is, using option value to modify the reference value of compensation of mineral resources exploitation, the modifications including the uncertainty of mineralresources exploitation and the strategic value of the game＇ s players and using altruistic utility function to modify the utility of the game＇ s players in the exploitation of mineral resources, to reflect intergenerational compensation value of mineral resources. Based on these, the paper builds the agreement pricing game model of mineral resources based on the Bayes rules and dynamic game equilibrium and analyses how the modification of the reference value and utility func- tion affect the strategic selection of the game＇ s players and the pricing equilibrium. The results show that getting option value and altruistic utility involved in combinational equilibrium evaluation model increases the cost of the company＇ s illegal mining and the owner＇ s selling of mineral resources at a low price. What＇ s more, the intergenerational allocation of mineral resources tends to be reasonable. Thus the sustainable use of mineral resources and the Pareto improvement of social welfare can be achieved.

关 键 词：矿产资源 开发补偿 代际公平 组合性均衡评价 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]