最后通牒博弈下风险偏好与社会偏好的互动关系  

Research on the Interaction between Risk Preferences and Social Preference Under the Ultimatum Game

作　　者：黄纯纯[1] 左聪颖 周业安[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京抱朴资产管理有限公司,北京100022 [3]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《经济管理》2014年第10期169-181,共13页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：本文通过最后通牒博弈实验研究了不确定条件下社会成员的分配行为,研究结果发现,最后通牒博弈中的提议者行为同时受到了利他偏好和害怕拒绝两种因素的影响;人们通常并不是理性的,并不擅长对他人的行为或偏好做出预期,并且个体在最后通牒博弈中作为提议者时通常会高估自己面临的风险;利他偏好,类别无论是自私者、中间者还是强利他者的个体的风险偏好对其在最后通牒博弈实验中的作为提议者的行为都不具有显著的影响。这说明,利他偏好为自私者以及中间者类型的个体,都将其在最后通牒博弈实验中作为提议者时的行为看成是一项风险行为。本文的研究结论对于正确认识和理解现实世界中大量具有最后通牒博弈属性的分配行为以及相关的再分配制度的设计具有重要的意义。According to the behavioral and experimental economics, the individual has not only self-interest preference and risk preferences, but also have social preferences. The social preferences include altruism, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. Under uncertain conditions, the interaction relationships may be produced between risk preferences and social preference, specifically, risk preference may crowd out the social preference, but risk preferences and social preferences will perhaps promote each other. This paper have studied these subjects. We designed a ultimatum game experiment in this paper, there are 108 subjects from university students in Zhejiang University, some subjects act as the proposers, and others are the responders. These subjects are given some tokens. One proposer will put forward a distribution scheme, the responder will accept or reject this scheme. If the responder agree to accept, the game is over, the proposer and responder can gain some tokens according to the distribution scheme. If tie responder select to reject, the game is over, but the proposer and responder can gain nothing. The new classical economic theory say that the proposer only give any tokens which is no zero for the responder, and the responder can＇ t reject, but this conclusion is error. This paper shows that the proposer has given about 40% of total tokens for the responder, and this behavior has occurred under uncertainty also. Why do the proponents want to give about 40% of total tokens for the responders？ This paper show that it is because there are social preferences. This paper studies the socialism of ultimatum game proposer＇s risk preference, and the relationships between the risk preferences and the social preferences. The result show that the behavior of ultimatum game proposer are affected by altruism preference and fear-to-refuse, fear-to-refuse is more persuadable than altruism preference in explaining the behavior of ultimatum game proposer. When the subject has more altruism, he or she will give more

关 键 词：最后通牒博弈 风险偏好 社会偏好 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学] F069.9