国际海运碳交易机制下减排产品供给企业竞争策略——基于船东减排产品类型偏好  

Competitive Strategy of Emissions Reduction Products Suppliers under Marine Emissions Trading Scheme: Based on Shipowners' Emissions Reduction Measure Preference

作　　者：胡昊[1] 黄泽慧[1] 史小宁[1] 巫景飞[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学船舶海洋与建筑工程学院,上海200240 [2]上海大学经济学院,上海200444

出　　处：《生态经济》2014年第10期90-93,共4页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划课题"国际应对气候变化中行业减排与市场机制中关键问题的支撑技术研究"(2012BAC20B03-08);中国清洁发展机制基金赠款项目"国际海运温室气体减排市场机制对策研究"(1213094-3)

摘　　要：以国际海运碳交易机制的实施为背景,在考虑船东对减排产品类型偏好具有差异的情况下,基于Hotelling模型,研究提供不同类型减排产品企业之间的竞争策略。通过分析Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈的均衡结果,得到船东对某类减排产品偏好的增加,会促进该类减排产品的价格上涨,市场份额扩大和收益增加。并且,在Stackelberg博弈中,主导企业获得较Nash博弈下更大的收益,而跟随企业的收益变化取决于船东减排偏好与减排产品成本之间的关系。Under the background of the implementation of Marine Emissions Trading Scheme, this paper studies competitive strategy of different emissions reduction products suppliers using Hotelling model with the consideration of shipowners＇ emissions reduction measure preference. According to Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, this paper concludes that if shipowners have a preference to an emissions reduction measure, price, market share and profit of products in one emission reduction measure will increase if shipowners prefer to this measure. Moreover, leading supplier gets more profit in Stackelberg game than in Nash game. While the change of the profit of suppliers is determined by the relationship between shipowners＇ emissions reduction measure preference and cost of products.

关 键 词：国际海运 减排产品类型偏好 HOTELLING模型 竞争策略 

分 类 号：F551[经济管理—产业经济] F224